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Death by Ambush:




On February 26, 1997, the Commonwealth of Virginia executed Coleman
Wayne Gray for the capital murder of Richard McClelland, the manager of
Murphy's Mart in Portsmouth, Virginia.' One might argue, however, that he was
actually executed for the murders of Lisa and Shanta Sorrell, despite having
never been charged with those crimes.2 The Sorrell murders looked somewhat
like McClelland's murder; however, the only direct link that the Commonwealth
had between Gray and the Sorrell murders was the testimony of Melvin Tucker,
Gray's accomplice in the McClelland murder.3 Tucker received a life sentence
in exchange for, among other things, his testimony that Gray told him that he
had killed the Sorrells.4 To convince the jury that Gray would "constitute a
continuing serious threat to society," the Commonwealth introduced testimony
from the detective and the medical examiner in the Sorrell case and, in effect,
conducted a mini-murder trial within the sentencing phase of the trial of the only
crime for which it had actually indicted Gray.5 Gray's counsel asked the trial
court to exclude the surprise evidence.6 The court refused, and the jury
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., Hanover
College, 1996. 1 thank professor David I. Bruck for his guidance and wisdom; Jessie Seiden,
Meghan Morgan, Max Smith, and Todd Egland for their editorial prowess; Marsha L. Dutton for
providing the stylistic foundation for everything I write; my 2006 VC3 colleagues for having my
back; and Carrie Herring for her patience and support.
1. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 155-56 (1996); Bob Piazza, Gray Executed for Slaying
Store Manager, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 27, 1997, at B1.
2. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157,175 (Va. 1987) (detailing the conviction and
death sentence of Coleman Gray).
3. Id.
4. Id.; Gray, 518 U.S. at 156.
5. Gray, 356 S.E.2d at 175; Brief for Petitioner at *7, Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152
(1996) (No. 95-6510); see VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (providing that one of the
aggravating factors that can make a capital defendant death eligible is a finding "that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society').
6. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157.
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sentenced Gray to death.7 Putting aside the Commonwealth's use of a tenuous
link between the murders to gain a death sentence, the most disturbing feature
of Gray's case was that the Commonwealth did not inform defense counsel that
it planned to conduct a full-scale "mini-trial" of the Sorrell murders until the
night before the sentencing phase began.8
Although the United States Supreme Court rejected Gray's claim for federal
habeas corpus relief under the Teague v. Lane? "new rule" doctrine, the issue of
adequate notice and discovery of the prosecution's evidence in aggravation
remains troublesome for capital defendants in Virginia.1" During the sentencing
phase, a capital defendant must investigate and present a complete and effective
case in mitigation while rebutting either or both aggravating circumstances of
vileness and future dangerousness.1 Because the Commonwealth may introduce
evidence of prior unadjudicated conduct in order to prove future dangerousness,
the capital defendant might have the difficult task of refuting acts that no one
ever proved he committed.12 Although the prosecution now has a statutory
obligation, upon request by the defendant, to give "a description of the alleged
unadjudicated criminal conduct" upon which it intends to rely, a defendant
should nonetheless seek additional discovery of that evidence so that he may
mount an effective sentencing defense. 3
The defendant's entitlement to such discovery is grounded in the due
process right of rebuttal elucidated in Gardner v. Florida,4 which held uncon-
stitutional a death sentence based upon "information [that the defendant] had
no opportunity to deny or explain."' 5 The defendant can bolster this due
7. Id. at 157-58.
8. Id. at 157.
9. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
10. Gray, 518 U.S. at 155,169-70; see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,309-11 (1989) (prohibit-
ing the retroactive application in federal habeas corpus proceedings of new rules of criminal
procedure unless the Court has deemed them to be "watershed" rules).
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004) (prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty unless a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that "the past criminal record of convictions
of the defendant... [shows that] there is a probability that [he] would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" or that the crime "was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
an aggravated battery to the victim'); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2004) (allowing the
prosecution to prove future dangerousness by introducing "evidence of the prior history of the
defendant").
12. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (allowing "the history and background of the
defendant" as admissible evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
13. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 2004) (requiring that the Commonwealth,
upon request, give notice to the defendant that it plans to introduce evidence of prior unadjudicated
conduct).
14. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
15. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
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DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE
process argument with the Sixth Amendment principle put forth in Ring v.
Arikona"6 that each element of the offense, including aggravating factors, that can
increase the maximum penalty to death must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.'" Because future dangerousness and vileness are sentencing
factors that operate essentially as elements of the crime of death-eligible capital
murder, a defendant's due process right to have a proper opportunity to defend
against these elements implies an expanded right to discovery of the evidence the
prosecution will use in aggravation.
Part II of this article analyzes Gray v. Netberland's and points out the
difficulties capital defense counsel face in a jurisdiction that allows introduction
of evidence of prior unadjudicated conduct to prove the future dangerousness
aggravating factor. Part III explores the status of criminal discovery in Virginia
and the measures taken to avoid such "sentencing by ambush" since Gray. Part
IV places Virginia's discovery practices in the national context of reciprocal and
open-file discovery rules. Finally, the article argues for a constitutional right to
notice and discovery of evidence of aggravating circumstances under Gardnerand
Ring.
II. Gray v. Netherland
According to the Commonwealth's evidence, on May 2, 1985, Coleman
Wayne Gray and Melvin Tucker planned a robbery of Murphy's Mart in
Portsmouth, Virginia. High on cocaine, the two waited in the parking lot until
store manager Richard McClelland got into his car to leave. Gray and Tucker
followed McClelland to a stop sign, where Gray blocked the man's car with his
own and ordered him, at the point of a .32-caliber revolver, into Gray's car.
After taking nearly $13,000 from the store, Gray drove McClelland and Tucker
into a remote area. Gray forced McClelland out of the car, made him lie on the
ground, and shot six rounds into the back of his head. Gray and Tucker left
McClelland's body behind and returned to McClelland's car, which they doused
in gasoline and set aflame. 9
Approximately five months before the Commonwealth charged Gray with
the capital murder of McClelland, police found Lisa Sorrell's body, and that of
her three-year-old daughter Shanta, in Sorrell's partially burned car in
16. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
17. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 (2002); see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
483 (2000) (prohibiting a defendant from being "expose[d]... to a penalty exceeding the maximum
he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone").
18. 518 U.S. 152 (1996); see Gray, 518 at 156-58 (illustrating the difficulties that defendants
may have when they are forced to rebut evidence concerning unadjudicated acts of which they had
insufficient notice).
19. Gray, 518 U.S. at 155--56. McClelland had recently fired Gray's wife. Id. at 156.
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Chesapeake, Virginia.2" Sorrell had been shot in the head six times with a .32-
caliber weapon.2 Gray denied any involvement in the Sorrell murder.22 Tucker,
however, who had pleaded guilty and received a lesser sentence in exchange for
testimony against Gray in the McClelland murder, testified that Gray told him
that "he had 'knocked off' Lisa Sorrell. ' 23 The Commonwealth never charged
Gray with the Sorrell murders and had not even publicly considered him a
suspect prior to the sentencing phase of the McClelland trial. 24  At the
McClelland sentencing hearing, however, the prosecution introduced testimony
from the detective and the medical examiner, who had investigated the Sorrell
murders, along with photographs from the crime scene and autopsy.2 The only
direct link between Gray and the Sorrell murders was Tucker's testimony, but in
closing argument, the prosecution pointed to the similarities between the two
murders. 26 Gray's guilt in the Sorrell murders, the prosecution argued, provided
sufficient evidence that he would present such a threat of future violence that he
should be sentenced to death.27 The jury agreed.28
The most troubling aspect of the prosecution's approach to its future
dangerousness case in Gray was not its use of evidence of a crime for which Gray
had not even been charged, for Virginia allows such evidence as long as it is
otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. 29 Rather, the problem lay in
20. Id. at 156-58.
21. Gray, 356 S.E.2d at 175. Chesapeake is approximately four miles from Portsmouth.
22. Id. at 175.
23. Id. at 166-67, 175.
24. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157-59.
25. Id. at 157-58.
26. Gray, 518 U.S. at 176-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. Gray, 356 S.E.2d at 177.
28. Gray, 518 U.S. at 158.
29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004) (providing that "[i]n cases of trial by
jury, evidence may be presented as to any matter which the court deems relevant to sentence"). In
Johnson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained the admissibility requirements for
evidence of other crimes used to prove modus operand, the evidence "need not bear such an exact
resemblance to the crime on trial as to constitute a 'signature.' "Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529
S.E.2d 769, 782 (Va. 2000) (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638, 648 (Va. 1994)
(citations omitted)). Instead, the crime offered as proof need only " 'bear a singular strong
resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged.' " Id. (quoting Chichester, 448 S.E. 2d at 648
(citations omitted)). In Johnson, the court upheld the trial court's admission of evidence of prior
rapes because those crimes "[bore] sufficient marks of similarity to the crime charged to establish
that the defendant [was] probably the common perpetrator." Id (quoting Chicbester, 448 S.E.2d at
649). The court outlined the similar facts as follows:
The victims were all young African-American women. Each victim knewJohnson, and
there were no signs of forced entry into the dwellings in which the crimes occurred.
•.. Each victim was raped, and the attacker stabbed the victims who resisted him.
The attacker asked Scott and Chambliss for a drink of water before he attacked them,
and a bloodstained broken drinking glass was found in the kitchen of Hall's apartment.
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the prosecution's failure to provide Gray with adequate notice of its intent to do
so.3° Because defense counsel had only expected to need to rebut Tucker's
somewhat suspect testimony, of which the prosecution had informed them
before trial, they were not ready for the last-minute announcement that the
prosecution intended to put on a full-scale modus operandi presentation regarding
the Sorrell case.31 As Gray's flummoxed lawyer protested:
[F]or the first time [the Commonwealth's Attorney] made known to
us... that he intends basically to put on evidence to try or go a long
ways in trying another murder. This is the first time that Mr. Eason
and I heard that he would do anything other than put on... supposed
inmates' statements.... [W]e were prepared for that, argumentatively
and evidentiary-wise. However, we are not prepared to rebut, put on
any rebuttal evidence because of the shortness of notice. We are not
prepared to try the Sorrell murder today. We have not been given
32sufficient notice.
The last-minute notice served the same function as the confidential
presentence report upon which the judge in Gardner based a death sentence:
Gray had no opportunity "to deny or explain" the Sorrell murders with evidence
that he had not committed them.33 With no time to investigate the Sorrell case
and having spent their scarce resources elsewhere, Gray's counsel were
hamstrung by the prosecution's late notice and left only with the weak argument
that the McClelland murder might have been committed by a copycat and not
by Gray.34 The jury, which had already convicted Gray of that crime and which
Id. at 783. Despite the fact that the Commonwealth did not believe that it had enough evidence to
charge Gray with the Sorrell murders, the judge found the similarities compelling enough to allow
the prosecution to introduce the Sorrell murders in the sentencing phase of the McClelland case.
Brief for Petitioner at *7, *9-*10 Gray (No. 95-6510).
30. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157.
31. Id. at 156-57. Rebutting the "sold" testimony of a jailhouse snitch required an entirely
different defense strategy because it was likely that the jury would not credit such testimony and
because Tucker would not have been able to testify to the graphic details of the Sorrell murders.
Gray, 518 U.S. at 184 (GinsburgJ., dissenting). Gray's counsel made the strategic decision to spend
their investigative resources elsewhere because Tucker's testimony alone would have been of
marginal significance to the prosecution. Id. For a more complete discussion of methods for
dealing with testimony from jailhouse snitches, see generally C. Blaine Elliott, lfe's Uncertainties: How
to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and Jailouse Snitches, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 1 (2003) (exploring the
uncertainty of snitch testimony and proposing defense strategies in response).
32. Brief for Petitioner at *7, Gray (No. 95-6510).
33. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157-59, 162; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351. Seegeneral# Gardner, 430 U.S. at
351-362 (overturning Gardner's death sentence because the sentencing judge based his sentencing
decision in part on a confidential presentence investigation report that neither Gardner nor his
counsel had seen).
34. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157-58. Although Gray's counsel requested more time from the judge
to investigate this new line of evidence, the Supreme Court found fault with them for not making
2005]
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had heard a great deal of gruesome evidence about the similar murder of a
woman and her baby, was understandably not convinced.35
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissenting opinion in Gray, the
problem arising from the late notice was not merely theoretical. 6 Had Gray's
defense counsel had sufficient notice and time to conduct an investigation of the
Sorrell murders, they would have discovered a great deal of evidence linking
Timothy Sorrell, Lisa's husband, to the Sorrell murders.37 Specifically, as a
federal habeas court later found, Timothy Sorrell had been the police's main
suspect in its investigation.3" At a party the night before the murders, Sorrell told
friends that he had a .32 caliber weapon. 9 He had been involved in the sale of
stolen goods, and Lisa was unhappy about these activities.' Two weeks before
the murders, the family purchased a life insurance policy for Lisa and named
Timothy and Shanta as the beneficiaries.4' Timothy had also made statements
to friends that he wanted his wife killed.42 The prosecution had knowledge of
all of the evidence that strongly suggested that the victims' husband and father,
not Gray, had committed the Sorrell murders.43 Unfortunately, with less than a
day's notice, Gray's counsel had no opportunity to investigate or uncover the
evidence that strongly linked Timothy to the murders.'
a formal motion for a continuance. Id. at 167 n.4. The Court concluded that the only formal relief
counsel sought was exclusion of the evidence. Id. at 167.
35. Id.; Gray, 518 U.S. at 175-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The prosecution introduced
testimony from the detective who had investigated the Sorrell murders and from the medical
examiner who made much of the six bullet wounds to the back of Sorrell's head. Brief for
Petitioner at *10, Gray (No. 95-6510). The prosecution also showed the jury multiple photographs
of the crime scene and the autopsy, including a photograph of "the driver's side of the Sorrel car,
with an empty baby seat.., a close-up.., color autopsy photograph of Lisa Sorrell with a portion
of her head shaved to show five gunshot wounds," and a "color photograph of Lisa Sorrell's body
at the crime scene, showing fire damage to the vehicle." Id. at *10 n.6.
36. Gray, 518 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 178-80.
38. Brief for Petitioner at *25-*26, Gray (No. 95-6510).
39. Id. at *26 n.28.
40. Id. at *27.
41. Id. at *26.
42. Id. at *26 n.28.
43. Gray, 518 U.S. at 179 n.8,179-80 (GinsburgJ., dissenting). The Commonwealth's failure
to notify Gray about its intention to use evidence from the Sorrell crime obviously created a
separate question of prosecutorial misconduct under Brady P. Maryland. Id. at 179 n.8. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment"). The Supreme Court, however, held that Gray had defaulted the Brady
claim because he had not raised it in state proceedings. Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62.
44. Gray, 518 U.S. at 178-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See Brief for Petitioner at *25-*27,
Gray (No. 95-6510) (discussing in detail the evidence linking Timothy Sorrell to the murders).
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Sufficient notice and discovery of the evidence the prosecution used against
Gray in the sentencing proceeding would likely have shifted the balance in
sentencing, at least with respect to the Sorrell murders. Gray's trial counsel were
already at a disadvantage, with no capital trial experience, little time, and fewer
resources than the prosecution." In a later federal evidentiary hearing, lead
counsel James Moore described the effect the late notice had on him:
It blew me completely away. And is blowing me eight-and-a-half,
almost nine years later, and it still blows me away. It is unbelievable.
It is incredible .... Coleman Gray had not even been arrested for the
thing, much less gone to a preliminary hearing, which is for a defense
counsel in Suffolk the only place you can do any real investigation.46
With more notice and more discovery, Gray's counsel might have had a better
chance to refute the prosecution's characterization of Gray as a serial murderer
based on evidence of a crime for which he had never been a suspect.47 Instead,
the jury heard only the prosecution's argument that "[Gray] committed murder
after murder, many in the same style, and he's done it to Richard McClelland,
he's done it to a man in California, he did it to Lisa Sorrell, and he even did it to
Shanta Sorrell, the little daughter.""
III. Criminal Discovery in Virginia
A. Cases Since Gray
Although no reported Virginia capital case has revealed another
prosecutorial surprise so extreme in the decade since the Supreme Court rejected
Gray's petition for relief, Virginia capital defendants still face unfair
disadvantages in investigating and rebutting the evidence the Commonwealth
presents in aggravation. In 1993 the Commonwealth enacted Code section 19.2-
264.3:2, requiring the prosecution to give notice, upon defense request, of the
unadjudicated misconduct evidence it plans to introduce.49 Because of this new
tool for discovery, the main issue in most of the recent Gray-type cases has been
the trial court's refusal to force the prosecution to narrow its construction of the
45. See Brief for Petitioner at *20, Gray (No. 95-6510) (detailing the lack of experience and
resources of trial counsel). Gray's lead trial attorneyJames Moore, described himself as "a defense
attorney with a 'country doctor practice of law,'" who had never defended a capital case. Id. His
co-counsel, Carl Eason, had not previously worked on a murder trial. Id. They had no investigator
to help them in the case. Id.
46. Id. at *21.
47. Id. at *11.
48. Id. Gray had previously been acquitted of a murder charge in California. Id. at *7 n.4.
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 2004) (requiring that the prosecution, upon
request, describe the unadjudicated conduct evidence it plans to introduce in the sentencing phase
of a capital trial).
2005]
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aggravating circumstance upon which it plans to seeks a death sentence. Capital
defendants often seek advance warning of the prosecution's case in aggravation
by requesting a bill of particulars that identifies the aggravating factors and
provides discovery of aggravating evidence.
0
Defendants who have attempted to use a motion for a bill of particulars to
gain access to evidence in aggravation so that they might adequately prepare their
sentencing cases have met with solid rejection by the Virginia courts. In Bailey
v. Commonwealth, 1 defense counsel requested "more extensive discovery because
of 'the unique and irreversible nature of the death penalty.' ,,2 The trial court
refused Bailey's request for expanded discovery and refused to order the
prosecution to "specify which of the aggravating factors of future dangerousness
or vileness it would rely upon in seeking to impose the death penalty." 3 The
Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the trial court had not erred in
refusing Bailey's requests because "Bailey received all of the discovery to which
he was entitled" and was adequately informed" 'of the nature and character of
the offense charged.' "" Faced with request after request from capital
defendants, Virginia courts have relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia's
holding in Strickkr v. Commonwealth5 that "[tihere is no general constitutional
right to discovery in a criminal case, even where a capital offense is charged."5 6
Occasionally a court in its discretion will grant a motion for a bill of particulars
that identifies the component of the vileness aggravator-depravity of mind,
torture, or aggravated battery-for which the prosecution will argue, but these
instances are rare. 7
50. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-230 (Michie 2004) (giving a trial court discretion to order the
Commonwealth to provide a bill of particulars); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 587 S.E.2d 532, 538
(Va. 2003) (denying a narrowing construction of the vileness component via a bill of particulars);
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 570, 575 (Va. 2000) (affirming the trial court's denial of a bill
of particulars because the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the nature of the
charge); Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114, 123 (Va. 1996) (same); Strickler v. Common-
wealth, 404 S.E.2d 227,233 (Va. 1991) (same); Commonwealth v. Waddler, No. 03-2890,2004 WL
2096104 at *1, *5--*6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 30, 2004) (denying a bill of particulars because the indict-
ment was sufficient to inform the defendant of the nature of the charge).
51. 529 S.E.2d 570 (Va. 2000).
52. Bailey, 529 S.E.2d at 577.
53. Id. at 575.
54. Id. at 577-78 (quoting Strickler, 404 S.E.2d at 233).
55. 404 S.E.2d 227 (Va. 1991).
56. Strickler, 404 S.E.2d at 233; see, e.g., Bailey, 529 S.E.2d at 578; Walker v. Commonwealth,
515 S.E.2d 565, 570 (Va. 1999); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763, 768 (Va. 1998);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 365, 372 (Va. 1994).
57. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 559 S.E.2d 652, 656 (Va. 2002) (noting the trial court's
approval of the prosecution's revising its bill of particulars to detail the specific components of the
vileness aggravator on which the Commonwealth sought death); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2
(Michie 2004) (identifying the aggravating factors that can make a defendant who is convicted of
[Vol. 17:2
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Virginia capital defendants have had little success in gaining expanded
discovery. In Walker v. Commonwealth,18 the Supreme Court of Virginia detailed
Walker's attempts to obtain more discovery prior to his capital trial.5 9 Walker
requested a bill of particulars that included the grounds for the capital murder
charge, the evidence of guilt, a listing and a narrowing construction of the
statutory aggravating factors, and the evidence in aggravation.6 °  The
Commonwealth responded by indicating that it would pursue a death sentence
based on the "depravity of mind" and "aggravated battery" sub-elements of the
vileness aggravating factor as well as on Walker's future dangerousness, as
evidenced by his adult and juvenile criminal records, the circumstances of the
offense, and evidence of Walker's other crimes.6 ' The Commonwealth did not,
however, afford Walker any discovery beyond that required by Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 3A:1 1.62 Walker claimed that this refusal violated both the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.63 He argued that "such extension [of discovery] is
required to ensure the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and to
meet the due process requirement of reliability in the determination that the
death penalty is the appropriate punishment."'  Unlike Gray, Walker was not
surprised by any evidence.6" Indeed, the Commonwealth gave him notice of the
kinds of evidence it planned to use at trial.66 Walker argued, however, that the
very nature of evidence about unproven crimes placed defense counsel at such
capital murder eligible for a death sentence as including "a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society" or the
fact that "his conduct in committing the offense ... was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim").
58. 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999).
59. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 569-70.
60. Id. at 570.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A: 11 (providing for limited reciprocal discovery in felony cases).
Criminal defendants can receive their own statements or confessions; "written reports of autopsies,
ballistic tests, fingerprint analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine and breath tests"; and reports
of physical and mental examinations of the accused and the victim. VA. SUp. CT. R. 3A:11(b)(1).
A defendant may also make a motion to allow inspection of "designated books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, buildings or places," if these items are material to the defense. VA. SUp. CT. K.
3A:11(b)(2). See infra Part 11I(B) of this article for a more detailed treatment of the items of
evidence Virginia allows its criminal defendants to discover.
63. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 569.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 569-70; Gray, 518 U.S. at 157.
66. Walker, 515 S.E.2d at 570.
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a disadvantage that only expanded discovery of specific evidence could allow
counsel to be effective.
67 The court did not agree with his argument.
68
In light of the situation in Gray, Walker's argument for expanded discovery,
especially ofunadjudicated conduct evidence, is compelling. Walker claimed that
he was denied due process of law and that his counsel had no chance to be
constitutionally effective because the Commonwealth supported its assertion of
future dangerousness with evidence of a crime that it did not prove he
committed.69 He articulated his claims as follows:
(1) without a positive connection of the evidence to the defendant by
some standard of proof, the evidence does not meet the test of
relevancy; (2) due process requires proof of unadjudicated prior
criminal acts beyonda reasonable doubt when such conduct is relied
upon to expose the defendant to greater or additional punishment;
and (3) the use of unadjudicated criminal acts evidence denies the
defendant his due process rights to notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on evidence used agst him which also
results in denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.7"
Because this evidence " 'exposes' the defendant to greater punishment and
presents a 'radically different situation from the usual sentencing procedures,'"
Walker argued, the Commonwealth should be required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he committed the prior crimes before the court allows
them to be received as evidence supporting the future dangerousness aggravating
factor.7 Although Walker's argument concerned simply the use of evidence of
unadjudicated conduct, its principles could support a claim that in order for a
capital defendant to have a legitimate opportunity to be heard and to confront
his or her accusers, notice and expanded discovery regarding crimes of which he
or she has not been convicted is necessary.
B. Criminal Discovery in Viginia
Virginia has a long history of minimizing criminal defendants' discovery of
the Commonwealth's evidence. In the 1939 case of Abdellv. Commonwealth,72 the




69. Id. at 571.
70. Id.
71. Id. (quoting McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)).
72. 2 S.E.2d 293 (Va. 1939).
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A different rule would tend to subject the attorney for the
Commonwealth to great annoyance, to the probable destruction or
loss of material evidence, and to compel the Commonwealth not only
to furnish the accused with a full bill of particulars, but to supply the
accused with the physical evidence it intends to introduce upon the
trial. Such a rule as is urged by accused would, in our opinion, subvert
the whole system of criminal law.
73
The court, while maintaining its dedication to the principles of a fair trial,
emphasized that it also had a fundamental duty to protect "the ability of the
Commonwealth to prosecute. ' 74 The Commonwealth cannot, however, abuse
this power by ignoring defense requests for discovery.m In Sennett v. Shetiff of
Fai~fax Couny,76 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
admonished a Commonwealth's attorney who refused to acknowledge a specific
request by the defendant for the names of witnesses.77 In granting a writ of
habeas corpus, the Fourth Circuit observed that " 'if the subject matter of [a
specific] request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming
materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by
furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge.' "78
1. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:1 1
Following the trend of the rest of the country, in 1972 Virginia eventually
codified a limited form of reciprocal criminal discovery in Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 3A:14, which later became Rule 3A:1 .7 ' According to the rule, a
defendant may request discovery of the following-
* "written or recorded statements or confessions made by the accused
... or the substance of any oral statements or confessions made by the
accused to any law enforcement officer";"°
0 "written reports of autopsies, ballistic tests, fingerprint analyses,
handwriting analyses, blood, urine and breath tests, other scientific
reports, and written reports of a physical or mental examination of the
73. Abdell v. Commonwealth, 2 S.E.2d 293, 298-99 (Va. 1939).
74. Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 208 S.E.2d 771, 774 (Va. 1974).
75. See Sennett v. Sheriff of Fairfax County, 608 F.2d 537, 538 (4th Cir. 1979) (admonishing
a prosecutor for not responding to a defendant's specific request for discovery).
76. 608 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1979).
77. Sennett, 606 F.2d at 538.
78. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
79. Michael J. Barbour et al., Criminal Procedure and Criminal Law: Viginia Supreme Court
Decisions During the 70's, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 585, 639 (1981).
80. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:11(b).
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accused or the alleged victim made in connection with the particular
case";
8 1
- "designated books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or
places ... upon a showing that the items sought may be material to
the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. 82
The defendant does not have a right to any statements made by prosecution
witnesses or to any of the Commonwealth's investigative work product.
8 3
If a defendant makes such a discovery request under Rule 3A:l 1, the
Commonwealth then has the right to inspect any scientific reports "the defense
intends to proffer or introduce into evidence at trial or sentencing."' When a
court grants the defendant statutory discovery, the rule requires the defendant
to disclose the following to the prosecution:
- "whether he intends to introduce evidence to establish an alibi and,
if so,... the place at which he claims to have been at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense";
- "[i]f the accused intends to rely upon the defense of insanity or
feeblemindedness, . . . any written reports of physical or mental
examination of the accused made in connection with the particular
case, provided, however, that no statement made by the accused in the
course of an examination ... shall be used by the Commonwealth in
its case-in-chief.
' 86
The Commonwealth and defense may also expand the scope of discovery by
agreement.8 7 With the approval of the court, when a "discovery order has been
entered in a criminal case, it governs discovery in that case."88
The Virginia discovery rule is still somewhat limited, however.8 9 The rule
does not entide the defendant to statements of witnesses for the prosecution or
to any other records related to the Commonwealth's investigation and
prosecution.9" This aspect of Virginia's discovery rule stands in contrast to the
federal rule for disclosure of witness statements, codified in the Jencks Act at 18




84. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A: 11 (c)(1).
85. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11(c) (2).
86. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(c)(3).
87. See Smoot v. Commonwealth, 599 S.E.2d 409,411 (Va. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the
prosecution had told the defense that it had an "open file" discovery policy).
88. Id.
89. VA. SUP. CT. R- 3A: 11(b)(2).
90. Id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000).
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discover the statements of the Government's witnesses until after direct
examination. 92 To allow for more effective cross-examination, however, the Act
does provide that "[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on
direct examination, the court shall ... order the United States to produce any
statement.., of the witness ... which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness has testified." 93 In practice, many federal courts and prosecutors
provide these statements to the defense prior to trial so they do not have to
disrupt the flow of the trial to allow the defense time to study the statements
before cross-examination.9 4 Virginia provides no such discovery, either before
or during trial.9"
2. Special Statutoty Discovery in Capital Cases
Since 1993 Virginia has provided for some discovery of particular evidence
in aggravation when a prosecutor chooses to prove a capital defendant's future
dangerousness through evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal acts.96 The
Commonwealth has long allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of prior
unadjudicated criminal conduct in order to prove future dangerousness, and it
was common practice for the prosecution to give notice to the defense of such
evidence.9" The Supreme Court of Virginia warned in Peterson v. Commonwealth98
that "[i]n fairness to the defendant... the preferred practice is to make known
to him before trial the evidence that is to be adduced at the penalty stage if he is
found guilty."" The Virginia General Assembly codified this "preferred
practice" in 1993 in Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:2, which provides as
follows:
Upon motion of the defendant, in any case in which the offense for
which the defendant is to be tried may be punishable by death, if the
attorney for the Commonwealth intends to introduce during a
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215, 1252 n.78 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that "it is
customary in many jurisdictions for the government to produce Jencks materials prior to trial");
United States v. Velarde-Lopez, 54 Fed. Appx. 265, 268 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the "district
court ordered the government to make early Jencks and Brady disclosure no later than 72 hours
before the beginning of trial').
95. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:1 1 (defining the limits of discovery allowed to both parties in a
criminal trial).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2 (Michie 2004) (requiring the prosecution to give
notice, upon request, of intent to introduce prior unadjudicated act evidence at sentencing).
97. See Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (Va. 1986) (providing that evidence
of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct is relevant to proving future dangerousness).
98. 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983).
99. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 526 (Va. 1983).
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sentencing proceeding ... evidence of defendant's unadjudicated
criminal conduct, [he or she] shall give notice in writing to the
attorney for the defendant of such intention. The notice shall include
a description of the alleged unadjudicated criminal conduct and, to the
extent such information is available, the time and place such conduct
will be alleged to have occurred."tu
The trial judge will direct the time by which the prosecution must provide this
notice." 1 By this enactment, Virginia responded in part to the unfairness
Coleman Gray faced when the prosecution ambushed his defense with evidence
of the Sorrell murders. 10 2
3. Bill of Particulars
One method that many capital defendants in Virginia have used to attempt
to garner more discovery is to demand the prosecution's evidence through a bill
of particulars."0 3 A defendant may, pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-230,
request a bill of particulars from the prosecution before he or she enters a plea. 4
Defendants request such a bill to require the prosecution to clarify the
indictment so that they know precisely against what charges they must defend.
The Due Process Clauses of both the United States and Virginia Constitutions
require such notice.' The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized this important
function of the bill of particulars in Hevener v. Commonwealth,'° explaining that
"[tihe purpose of a bill of particulars is to state sufficient facts regarding the
crime to inform an accused in advance of the offense for which he is to be
tried.'
107
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:2.
101. Id.
102. Gray, 518 U.S. at 157.
103. Black's Law Dictionary defines a bill ofparti6culars as "[a] formal, detailed statement of the
claims or charges brought by a plaintiff or a prosecutor, usu[ally] filed in response to the defendant's
request for a more specific complaint." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (8th ed. 2004). Legal
scholars have noted the frequent use of the bill of particulars as a tool for discovery: "Although
it has been said that the bill of particulars is not a discovery device, it seems plain that it is a means
of discovery.... It is the one method open to a defendant in a criminal case to secure the details
of the charge against him." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §129
(3d ed. 1999).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-230 (Michie 2004) (stating "[a] court of record may direct the
filing of a bill of particulars at any time before trial").
105. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation"); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (stating that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (stating "[t~hat in criminal prosecutions a man hath a right
to demand the cause and nature of his accusation").
106. 54 S.E.2d 893 (Va. 1949).
107. Hevener v. Commonwealth, 54 S.E.2d 893, 899 (Va. 1949).
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A capital defendant may seek a bill of particulars to force the prosecution
to reveal each element of the charge that makes the offense capital, including the
particular aggravating factor upon which the Commonwealth is basing its request
for a death sentence.' In Swisher v. Commonwealth,' ° the defendant requested a
detailed explanation of the aggravating factors, including the specifications of all
"components of the factor [upon which the Commonwealth intends to rely] ...
[and] to further identify every narrowing construction of that factor on which it
intends to offer evidence.""' Swisher requested these details and the evidence
upon which they were based to provide him with adequate opportunity to make
pretrial challenges to the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty statutes and
to safeguard his right to the effective assistance of counsel."' In this manner a
capital defendant can demand that the Commonwealth state, not only that it
plans to prove vileness or future dangerousness as the basis of rendering the
defendant death-eligible upon conviction, but also to specify upon which
component of vileness-torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery-it is
relying."
2
Virginia provides a criminal defendant with another ground upon which to
request a bill of particulars in Virginia Code section 19.2-266.2.13 This code
section requires the defense to file any motions seeking suppression of evidence
or dismissal on constitutional grounds prior to trial."4 The section also provides
that the trial court "shall, upon motion of the defendant, direct the
Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars" to "assist the defense in filing such
motions or objections.""' A defendant may also request that the trial court
order the Commonwealth to supplement the bill of particulars for good cause." 6
Although the trial court has the discretion to decide if a bill of particulars is
necessary to assist the defense, a capital defendant should nonetheless request
a bill of particulars both to clarify the indictment and to assist in making
evidentiary motions in the hopes that the bill might provide some of the
Commonwealth's evidence."
17
108. See Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 767-68 (detailing Swisher's request for a bill of particulars
regarding his capital murder charge).
109. 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998).
110. Swisher, 506 S.E.2d at 767-68.
111. Id. at 768. The court rejected his requests because it concluded that "[tihe indictment
adequately informed Swisher of the charged offenses." Id.
112. See supra note 11 (explaining VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2004)).




117. See Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp. 2d 497, 538 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting that the "good
cause" requirement in Virginia Code section19.2-266.2 keeps the granting of a bill of particulars to
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The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the granting of a motion for
a bill of particulars is within the discretion of the trial court, and it has rejected
attempts to use a bill of particulars as a discovery tool."' In £Quesinbery v.
Commonwealth,"9 the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted section 19.2-230 as
a purely discretionary rule and stated that "a defendant is not entitled to a bill of
particulars as a matter of right."'2 ° If a trial court finds that the indictment is
sufficient to give the defendant "notice of the nature and character of the
offense charged so he can make his defense," then it need not grant a
defendant's motion for a bill of particulars.' Quesinberry had requested that
the trial court require the prosecution to identify the grounds on which it
believed him guilty of capital murder and the aggravating factors on which it
sought a death sentence.' 2 He also requested that the Commonwealth provide
him with "the evidence, and all of it, upon which it intends to rely in seeking a
conviction ... upon the charge of capital murder .. . [,J in support of the
aggravating factors identified, and ... in support of its contention that death is
the appropriate punishment."''2 3 The court found no error in the trial court's
denial of the motion, for it found Quesinberry's attempt to use the "bill of
particulars to expand the scope of discovery in a criminal case" to be
improper. 12 The court, in rejecting such requests for evidence, appears to be
relying on the principle that "there is no general constitutional right to discovery
in a criminal case, even when a capital offense is charged.'
2 5
assist in evidentiary motion-making within the discretion of the trial court).
118. See Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Va. 1991) (holding that a bill
of particulars need only give notice of the nature of the charge and may not be used as a tool for
discovery).
119. 402 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1991).
120. Quesinberry, 402 S.E.2d at 223; see Mickens v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 302, 306 (Va.
1996) (stating that "[w]hether to require the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars is a matter
that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court"); Goins, 470 S.E.2d at 123 (agreeing that "[a]
defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of right"); Roach v. Commonwealth, 468
S.E.2d 98, 107 (Va. 1996) (same).
121. Wilder v. Commonwealth, 225 S.E.2d 411,413 (Va. 1976); see Strckkr, 404 S.E.2d at 233
(finding the indictment detailed enough not to require a bill of particulars); Ward v. Common-
wealth, 138 S.E.2d 293, 296-97 (Va. 1964) (same); Tasker v. Commonwealth, 121 S.E.2d 459,
462-63 (Va. 1961) (same); Sims v. Commonwealth, 507 S.E.2d 648, 653-54 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding that the indictments of Sims sufficiently notified him of the nature and character of the
crime with which he was charged).
122. Quesinberr, 402 S.E.2d at 223.
123. Id.; see Stickler, 404 S.E.2d at 232-33 (noting Strickler's request that the prosecution give
him a detailed list of evidence it planned to use in its case).
124. Quesinbery, 402 S.E.2d at 222; see Raja v. Commonwealth, 581 S.E.2d 237, 243 (Va. Ct.
App. 2003) (criticizing Raja's attempt to use a bill of particulars to conduct a "fishing expedition"
into the prosecution's evidence).
125. Swisber, 506 S.E.2d at 768; see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (holding
that "[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case"); Lowe v. Common-
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4. Constitutional Discovey
The Supreme Court's decisions in Brady v. Maylandl26 and its progeny also
expanded the scope of criminal discovery in Virginia.'27 Brady held "that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 128
The Court refined this principle in United States v. Agurs129 by making clear that
the prosecution had a duty to disclose even if the defendant made no request for
the evidence. 3 ° Evidence subject to the Brady rule of disclosure must be material
and exculpatory or impeachment evidence.' The Court has defined evidence
as "material" when it creates "a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."'3 2 Virginia acknowledged the Brady rule in Stover v. Commonwealth, 33
thus giving Commonwealth prosecutors a continuing duty to disclose to the
defense any evidence they or their agents have or know of that is material and
exculpatory or of value in impeachment."' In Hoke v. Netherland,3 however, the
Fourth Circuit held that Brady did not require disclosure of evidence to which the
defendant already had access or could get from other sources. 36
wealth, 239 S.E.2d 112, 118 (Va. 1977) (emphasizing that the accused has no constitutional right
to discovery); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989) (same); Strickler, 404
S.E.2d at 233 (same).
126. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
127. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (defining as prosecutorial misconduct the withholding of material
evidence that is favorable to the defendant).
128. Id.
129. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
130. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that the prosecution had a
duty to disclose Brady evidence even when the defendant made no request for it).
131. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (subjecting
impeachment evidence to the Brady rule).
132. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
133. 180 S.E.2d 504 (Va. 1971).
134. See Stover v. Commonwealth, 180 S.E.2d 504, 509 (Va. 1971) (incorporating the Brady
rule into Virginia practice); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (providing
further exposition of the Brady rule). For a more thorough discussion of current issues related to
the Brady doctrine, see Jannice E. Joseph, The New Russian Rouktte: Brady Revisited, 17 CAP. DEF.J.
33 (2004).
135. 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cit. 1996).
136. Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350,1355-56 (4th Cit. 1996). In Hoke, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that had Hoke's counsel "undertaken a reasonable and diligent investigation," they would
have found the evidence of the victim's prior sexual partners that they claimed the prosecution
withheld from them. Id. at 1355. The court reasoned that if the police found these witnesses, then
defense counsel could also have found them. Id.
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5. Extra-Statutory Prosecutonial Discovegy
While the capital defendant's opportunities for discovery are limited by
statute and modest due process rights, the Commonwealth has means of
discovery in addition to those available under reciprocal discovery rules. If an
indigent defendant seeks funding for expert or investigative assistance underAke
v. Oklahoma,37 a trial court must provide an indigent defendant with expert
assistance upon a showing of reasonable necessity for the services required.'38
Virginia law, however, does not require the trial court to consider the defendant's
request ex parte.'39 An open hearing allows the Commonwealth access to the
testimony and evidence the defense presents at the hearing to make its case for
an expert. 4" Although this access is not an acknowledged form of discovery, the
prosecution will be able to learn defense strategies and to follow defense leads,
especially when the defense chooses not to develop them at trial. 4 '
The prosecution may also obtain de facto discovery of an indigent capital
defendant's evidence if the defense seeks appointment of a mental health expert.
If mental health or mental retardation is to be an issue in the case and if the
defendant is indigent, the defendant may ask the court to appoint a mental health
or mental retardation expert "to evaluate the defendant and to assist the defense
in the preparation and presentation of information concerning the defendant's
history, character, or mental condition."' 42 If the defendant takes advantage of
this expert appointment and then uses any of the resulting evidence in mitigation
Virginia law requires the defense to provide the expert's report to the
Commonwealth. 43 In addition, the Commonwealth may move to have the
defendant evaluated by its own experts, and the reports generated by that
137. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
138. SeeAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,83 (1985) (holding that due process requires the state
to provide an indigent defendant with a mental health expert when the defendant's sanity will "be
a significant factor at trial"); Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920,925 (Va. 1996) (explaining
the showing defendants must make in order to trigger their constitutional right to a mental health
expert).
139. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENsIvE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN
VIRGINIA, 62-63 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf; see O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 498-99 (Va.
1988) (rejecting O'Dell's claim thatAke requires a hearing forgranting an indigent defendant expert
assistance to be conducted ex parte). For a more complete discussion of the expert ex parte
dilemma, see generally Justin B. Shane, Monq Talks: An Indigent Defendant's Right to an Ex Parte
Hearingfor Expert Funding, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 347 (2005).
140. See Shane, supra note 139 at 353-55 (explaining the advantage the prosecution gains by
having access to the defendant's expert funding hearing).
141. Id. The leads upon which the defense chooses not to rely might include pieces of the
kind of evidence the prosecution needs to make its case.
142. VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (A) (Michie 2004); see VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(A)
(Michie 2004) (providing similar requirements for an appointment of a mental retardation expert).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(C), (D); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(C), (D).
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examination will become available to the prosecuting attorneys before the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial has begun.
44
IV. Discovey Across the Nation
A. GeneralApproaches to Discovery
Virginia is not unusual in its parsimonious approach to criminal discovery
by defendants. Historically, most states have adhered to the principle that there
is no general right of discovery by an accused in a criminal trial.1 4 5 Other states
have pointed out that due process does not require discovery of the
prosecution's evidence."4 In the interest of justice, however, states cannot deny
the accused discovery completely. AsJustice WilliamJ. Brennan has pointed out,
the truth-seeking function of a trial justifies an extension of discovery rights to
criminal defendants. 47 Justice Brennan argued that "the truth is more likely to
come out at trial if there has been an opportunity for the defense to investigate
the evidence.' 141 In the spirit of this principle, most state legislatures have
codified rules allowing discovery of some of the prosecution's evidence. 49
No matter what the discovery rule of the state, in nearly every jurisdiction,
discovery is ultimately subject to the discretion of the court. ° Often, the
prosecution and defense can agree on reciprocal discovery, and the trial court can
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1(F); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.2(F). For a more
complete discussion of the discovery implications of Virginia's mental health expert provision, see
generally MarkJ. Goldsmith, Ask and the Commonwealth Shall Receive: The Imbalance of Viginia's Mental
Health Expert Statute, 17 CAP. DEF.J. 293 (2005).
145. See, e.g., Edens v. State, 363 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Ark. 1963) (stating that there is no general
right to discovery in criminal cases); Mendelsohn v. People, 353 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo. 1960) (same);
Padgett v. State, 59 So. 946, 948-49 (Fla. 1912) (same); Blevins v. State, 141 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga.
1965) (same); Wendling v. Commonwealth, 137 S.W. 205,211 (Ky. 1911) (same); State v. Williams,
30 So. 2d 834, 835 (La. 1947) (same); Commonwealth v. Jordan, 98 N.E. 809, 811 (Mass. 1911)
(same); State v. Spica, 389 S.W.2d 35, 51 (Mo. 1965) (same); Cramer v. State, 15 N.W.2d 323, 327
(Neb. 1944) (same); State v. Lavallee, 163 A.2d 856, 857-58 (Vt. 1960) (same); State v. Herman, 262
N.W. 718, 721-22 (Wisc. 1935) (same).
146. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 134 A.2d 266, 267-68 (Del. 1957) (stating that a criminal
defendant has no due process right of discovery); State v. Gray, 286 So. 2d 644, 647 (La. 1973)
(same); Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 13 N.E.2d 382,385 (Mass. 1938) (same).
147. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Tymll Wili'ams Memorial Lecture; The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or.Quest for Truth?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (1990).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1 (defining discovery rights in criminal cases); DEL. R. CRM.
P. 16 (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.05 (West 2001) (same); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412 (same); MD. R.P.
4-263 (same); Mo. SUP. CT. R. 25.19 (same); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (same); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 16 (same);
VT. R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (same); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (same).
150. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CPNIu. P. 15.1 (stating that "[ulpon... showing that [the defendant] has
substantial need ... for additional material or information not otherwise covered by Rule 15.1,..
. the court in its discretion may order any person to make it available to him or her").
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order discovery according to that agreement.'' In some cases, the trial court
may grant the defendant discovery of specific evidence upon a showing of
materiality.'5 2 As in Virginia, when a defendant seeks to use a bill of particulars
to gain access to expanded discovery of guilt or aggravation evidence, courts
across the country usually reject the attempt as long as the charge is sufficiently
detailed to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges."5 3
B. ReciprocalDiscovegy
In response to claims of a discovery advantage for the defense, many states
in the 1970s created reciprocal discovery rules.'54 These rules provide that once
the defendant requests the limited discovery available, he or she triggers the
state's right to discovery in return.' In these jurisdictions, the prosecution may
get access to information about specific defenses the accused might raise,
statements of witnesses who will testify at trial, and expert and scientific
reports. 56 Many states have even given the prosecution independent rights of
discovery, regardless of the defense's request.
5 7
Like Virginia, Michigan has a reciprocal discovery rule that provides defense
evidence to the prosecution upon the defense's request for discovery.'
58
Michigan enacted this law to even the discovery balance in criminal cases and,
as a result, greatly extended the amount of discovery the defense now must
151. See, e.g., Daniels v. State, 275 So. 2d 169,171 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (ordering discovery
under an agreement); People v. Crawford, 252 N.E.2d 483, 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (same); State
v. Walters, 408 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (La. 1982) (same); Commonwealth v. Smith, 208 A.2d 219, 229
(Pa. 1965) (same).
152. See People v. Chapman, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (Cal. 1959) (finding error in the trial court's
refusal of a discovery order because the defendant showed that the evidence sought was material
and relevant); Williams v. State, 819 N.E.2d 381, 387-88 (nd. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that
Williams made a showing of materiality sufficient to grant a motion for specific discovery of the
alleged victim's prescription records).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1549-52 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying
defendant's attempt to obtain discovery of evidence via a motion for a bill of particulars); State v.
Devote, 309 So. 2d 325, 328 (La. 1975) (same); Wilson v. State, 242 A.2d 194, 200 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1968) (same); State v. Moore, 504 A.2d 804,810 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (same); State
v. Williams, 452 S.E.2d 245,276 (N.C. 1994) (same); Commonwealth v. Mamon, 297 A.2d 471,478
(Pa. 1972) (same).
154. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1567, 1569-70 (1986).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1570. See id. at nn.34-54 for a listing of the states with reciprocal discovery statutes
and details about the items each party may request in discovery.
157. See id. at 1579 n.34 (listing the states that allow the prosecution independent rights of
discovery).
158. See MICH. CT. R. 6.201 (detailing the discovery process in a criminal trial).
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provide to the prosecution.'59 Pursuant to Michigan's rule, the defense can
request exculpatory evidence; police reports; statements made by the defendant,
co-defendants, and accomplices; "affidavits, warrants, and returns relating to a
search or seizure;" plea agreements, grants of immunity, and agreements for
testimony; "names and addresses of lay and expert witnesses;" statements of lay
witnesses; reports by and for expert witnesses; criminal records of witnesses;
and documents and tangible objects. 6 ° In return the prosecution may discover
"names and addresses of lay and expert witnesses," statements by lay witnesses,
reports by or for expert witnesses, criminal records, and documents and tangible
objects in the possession of the defendant, if the defense plans to use any of the
above at trial. 6'
California has taken a similar route, increasing prosecution discovery while
limiting defense discovery.'62 The California discovery rule allows the pro-
secution to "retain[] its right of access to all sources of information that existed
[before the change] and [to] continue . . . to enjoy unfettered access to
nontestimonial evidence.' '163 The defense, on the other hand is "no longer...
entitled to information that the prosecution does not intend to offer at trial
unless that information is specified in the new statute or is recognized as an
exception."'' " If this trend in discovery rules continues, capital defendants might
face new challenges in their already daunting task of defending against the State's
request for the death penalty.
At the other end of the scale of reciprocal discovery rules, Florida allows a
criminal defendant extensive discovery of the prosecution's evidence. 165 Florida
allows the defendant to discover "a list of the names and addresses of all persons
known to the prosecutor to have information that may be relevant to any offense
charged or any defense thereto, or to any similar fact evidence to be presented
at trial.' 66 More importantly, the state discovery rule allows the defense access
to the statements of any such person and also allows the defense to "take the
deposition upon oral examination of any person authorized by this rule.' '167 The
rule provides that "[a]ny [such] deposition... may be used by any party for the
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a
159. Mark A. Esqueda, Note, Michigan Strives to Balance the Adversarial Process and Seek the Truth
with Its New Reciprocal Criminal Discovery Rule, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 317, 339-345 (1997).
160. Id. at 342-43.
161. MICH. CT. R. 6.201; Esqueda, supra note 159, at 342-43.
162. Laura Berend, Less Reliable Prh'minagy Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in
Calfornia: Discovery Before andAfter Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 465, 499 (1998).
163. Id. at 499-500.
164. Id. at 500.
165. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 (outlining discovery for both parties in a criminal case).
166. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(A).
167. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)(1)(B), (h)(1).
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witness. '  This deposition process allows counsel to gain a more complete
picture of the prosecution's case and a better opportunity to prepare a defense.169
C. Open-File Discovety
Many jurisdictions have expanded the right to criminal discovery in practice
by maintaining an open-file policy, in which the prosecution allows the defense
open access to its files, with some redactions to protect privileged information. 7
Although an open-file discovery policy allows the defense more access to the
prosecution's evidence, it would not have prevented the problem that arose in
Gray. A diligent and thorough attorney or investigator would certainly learn
more through open-file discovery than through standard reciprocal discovery.
If she did not, however, know that she was going to have to defend against an
uncharged prior offense, then no amount of access to the prosecution's files
would point her to the useful information.
Strickler v. Greene"7' provides a cautionary lesson on the dangers of reliance
on a prosecutor's open-file policy.'72 In Strickler, the prosecutor maintained an
open-file policy, and defense counsel, relying on that policy, filed no motion for
Brady material.'73 Unfortunately for Strickler, the prosecution's file did not
contain the exculpatory police reports that Strickler could have used to impeach
one of the Commonwealth's main witnesses.'74 The witness testified vividly and
in great detail at trial that she had seen Strickler confront the victim in the
parking lot of a mall and abduct her; she also identified Strickler in court.'75 The
exculpatory police reports, on the other hand, showed that the witness had
trouble with her memory and was not successful in identifying most of the actors
168. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(h)(1).
169. See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551, 556 (2004) (noting that Nixon's counsel
"deposed all of the State's potential witnesses").
170. While few states have open-file statutes, many state jurisdictions allow the prosecutor
discretion to have an open-file discovery policy. See, e.g., Martin v. State, No. CR-99-2249, 2003 WL
21246587, at *1, *6 (Ala. Crim. App. May 30, 2003) (stating that there can be no Brady violation
when a prosecutor allows open-file discovery); Robinson v. State, 879 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Ark.
1994) (requiring a prosecutor with an open-file policy to make sure that the records in the file are
complete and accurate); State v. Crews, 799 P.2d 592,607 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (taking note of the
prosecution's open file for discovery). But see People v. Bennett, 402 N.E.2d 650, 655 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (warning that a simple open-file offer by the prosecutor will not satisfy a defendant's specific
request for discovery).
171. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
172. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283-84 (1999) (concluding that a defendant may
rely on a prosecutor's open-file policy to contain all exculpatory evidence).
173. Id. at 276.
174. Id. at 273-75.
175. Id. at 270-73.
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in the altercation she said she had witnessed.1 76 The United States Supreme
Court conceded that this evidence would have been useful to the defense on
cross-examination, but it ultimately concluded that Strickler had not
demonstrated prejudice for his failure to raise a Brady claim on direct appeal.
77
The Court held that the defense may reasonably rely on a prosecution's open file
to contain all Brady material, but if counsel misses such material because of that
reliance, the high standard of materiality under Brady means that defendants will
have difficulty obtaining relief when they do discover the material after trial and
conviction.
178
V. The Agumentfor Discoverj of the Prosecution's Evidence in Aggravation
The argument for expanding discovery in capital cases beyond state law and
Brady has its foundation in the constitutional imperatives for individualized
sentencing determinations established by Gregg v. Georgia 79 and Locket v. Ohio. "0
In accordance with that imperative, states have expanded their evidentiary rules
to allow more evidence in the sentencing phase of capital trials. 8' A defendant
in Virginia may introduce in mitigation any relevant evidence relating to his
"history and background."' 8 As long as the evidence is connected to the
defendant, the trial court must allow it.'83 The prosecution may, as well, delve
into the history of the defendant to find support for its argument that that
176. Id. at 273-74.
177. Id. at 296. It was not until habeas corpus proceedings that Strickler's counsel discovered
the existence of this evidence. Id. at 278.
178. Strickkr, 527 U.S. at 283 n.23. See Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256 (2004), for a lesson
in the dangers of relying on a prosecutor's open-file policy. See also Scott E. Sundby, Falkn
Superbemes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale ofBrady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L REV. 643,
645-50 (2002) (discussing the practical meaning of the "reasonable likelihood" standard in Brady
cases).
179. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
180. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
181. See Zantv. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862,879 (1982) (stating "[w]hat is important at the [death]
selection stage is an indAiduaizVd determination on the basis of the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime").
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004).
183. See Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (2004) (holding that the standard for
relevance of mitigating evidence in capital cases is no different from that in other contexts). For
a more complete discussion of Tennard, see generally MarkJ. Goldsmith, Case Note, 17 CAP. DEF.
J. 115 (2004) (analyzing Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004)). But see Bums v. Common-
wealth, 541 S.E.2d 872,893 (Va. 2001) (upholding the trial court's denial of evidence of maximum-
security prison conditions because such evidence was not connected to Burns's own history and
background).
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individual deserves to be put to death; it may even take the Gray approach and
link the defendant to egregious crimes never previously alleged or proven.'
84
The prosecution has all of the advantage in sentencing. With the resources
of the Commonwealth behind it, it can weave convincing narratives of just how
dangerous and deserving of death capital defendants can be. Due process and
fundamental fairness require that a defendant be properly equipped to respond
to, challenge, and test the accuracy of the prosecution's narrative. For defense
counsel to be constitutionally effective, they need to know what to investigate
and to present a defense to the prosecution's case.
A capital defendant's best argument for the right to discovery of evidence
in aggravation starts in the due process right of rebuttal elucidated by the
Supreme Court in Gardner.8' In holding that a capital defendant may not be
sentenced to death "on the basis of information which he had no opportunity
to deny or explain," the Court applied the fundamental principles of due process
to the capital sentencing phasing.186 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
that no state "shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."' 87 In many other contexts, the Court has defined due
process as notice of the claim and " 'the opportunity to be heard.' ,,188 The
Fourteenth Amendment also incorporates to the states the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation.189 The Supreme Court itself stated in Crane v. Kentucky9°
that due process requires a " 'meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.' "'9' For a capital defendant to take advantage of the rights of notice,
opportunity, and confrontation so that she or he may mount a meaningful and
complete defense, discovery of the evidence the prosecution will use to prove
aggravating circumstances is essential.
This claim draws added support from the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ring v. AriZona."'9 Applying to Arizona's capital sentencing scheme
184. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B).
185. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
186. Id.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
188. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914)); see Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (stating that "[t]he right to a hearing
embraces ... a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet
them"); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126 n.22 (1991) (noting "the importance of giving the
parties sufficient notice to enable them to identify the issues on which a decision may turn').
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
190. 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
191. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984)).
192. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (holding Arizona's death scheme unconstitutional because it allowed
the judge to find the aggravating factors that made the defendant eligible for the death penalty).
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the principle of Apprendi v. New Jersey93 that facts that increase the maximum
allowable sentence must be considered as elements of the offense, Ring required
that Arizona juries find beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstances
that made a defendant eligible for a death sentence) 94 The reasonable doubt
standard demands that the evidence presented by the prosecution be tested in
a meaningful and effective way.'95 To ensure adversarial testing and to guarantee
the capital defendant's right to due process of law, effective assistance of
counsel, confrontation of witnesses, and trial by jury, Virginia courts should
allow discovery of the evidence the Commonwealth plans to adduce to prove the
aggravating circumstances that open the door to death.
V. Conclusion
Capital defense attorneys in Virginia should remember what happened to
Coleman Gray and his counsel. Expecting merely to defend against a jailhouse
snitch's uncorroborated accusation, Gray had no idea that the Commonwealth
intended to conduct a mini-trial of the Sorrell murders during his sentencing
hearing.' 96 Defense attorneys should not be lulled into a false sense of the
prosecution's case, even when granted discovery. When surprised with evidence
because of failure of adequate notice or discovery, an attorney should always ask
for a continuance and never rely solely on a motion for exclusion, as did Gray's
attorneys. 97
In the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, it is crucial for the
defense to be able to rebut the prosecution's claims regarding the existence of
aggravating circumstances that justify the imposition of a death sentence.
Especially in Virginia, where the prosecution can introduce evidence of acts for
which the defendant was never convicted or charged, fundamental fairness calls
for full discovery and notice of this type of evidence. Asking the prosecution to
itemize its evidence and witnesses in aggravation will place no undue burden on
the Commonwealth, for the request is specific and relevant, and the prosecution
should have nothing to fear from full disclosure. If the Commonwealth wants
193. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
194. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492-94 (determining that factors that
increase the maximum sentence of an offense must be considered as elements of the offense).
195. Defendants in Florida and North Carolina have mounted Ring arguments that they
deserved notice of aggravating factors, but their supreme courts have rejected those arguments, and
the Supreme Court has thus far denied certiorari. See, e.g., Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 54
(Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 950 (2003); Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 702-03 (Fla. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 977 (2002); Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 724-25 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1120 (2003); State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 23 (N.C. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 910 (2001).
196. Gray, 518 U.S. at 156-57.
197. Id.
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to be sure that it is executing only the worst of the worst, such disclosure of
evidence in aggravation will only aid that goal.
